Institutional causes of macroeconomic volatility by Levon Barseghyan & Riccardo DiCecio
      Research Division 
          Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 




























FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
Research Division 
P.O. Box 442  
St. Louis, MO 63166 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working 
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be 




Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
May 25, 2009
Abstract
We investigate the relation between the quality of institutions and macroeconomic
volatility. Using instrumental variable regressions, we show that higher barriers to entry
lead to higher volatility: A one standard deviation increase in entry costs increases
the standard deviation of output growth by roughly 40% of its average value in our
sample. To the contrary, property rights protection has no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect
on volatility.
Keywords: entry costs, entry regulation, entry barriers, property rights, institu-
tions, volatility.
JEL classification: O11, O17, O43.
￿We are indebted to L. Alfaro, A. Charlton, and F. Kanczuk for sharing their statistics on the ￿rm-size
distribution across countries. C. Gascon provided excellent research assistance. Any views expressed are our
own and do not necessarily re￿ ect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve
System. Corresponding author: Levon Barseghyan, lb247@cornell.edu.1 Introduction
Poor macroeconomic policies in less developed countries have been blamed for the negative
relationship between growth and macroeconomic volatility. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson,
and Tchaicharoedn (2003) o⁄er a di⁄erent explanation: Volatility is related to institutional
quality; once institutions are controlled for, macroeconomic policies (i.e., ￿scal, monetary,
and exchange rate policy) have only a minor e⁄ect on volatility. This ￿nding raises a question
of how exactly institutions a⁄ect output volatility, more precisely, which institutional features
are most responsible for the relation documented by Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and
Tchaicharoedn (2003). We use instrumental variables (IV) regressions to disentangle the
e⁄ect of two distinct types of institutions: entry barriers and property rights protection. We
￿nd that higher entry barriers lead to higher output volatility. To the contrary, property
rights protection appears to have no e⁄ect on output volatility.
In the data entry barriers and property rights protection are correlated, although their
economic e⁄ects, both empirically and theoretically, are quite di⁄erent. Barseghyan (2008)
shows that worse property rights protection leads to a lower educational attainment and
a lower capital-output ratio: A lack of property rights enforcement discourages investment
in all types of capital. The e⁄ect of property rights on total factor productivity (TFP)
is much weaker and is mostly statistically insigni￿cant. On the other hand, entry costs
have no e⁄ect on the capital-output ratio, but have a strong e⁄ect on TFP. According to
prevalent theories of industry structure (e.g., Hopenhayn, 1992) this is exactly what one
should expect: higher entry barriers reduce entry, protect incumbent ￿rms, and allow those
with lower productivity to survive. Thus, the results of our paper suggest that di⁄erences
in output volatility are driven by industry structure, which, in turn, is signi￿cantly a⁄ected
by entry barriers. This is consistent with the ￿ndings of Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson,
and Tchaicharoedn (2003) that a signi￿cant part of the e⁄ect of institutions on economic
outcomes occurs via microeconomic channels.
In related papers, we explore the link between entry costs and cross-country output and
TFP di⁄erences, and between entry barriers and output volatility through the lenses of
1general equilibrium models. Barseghyan, DiCecio, and Tsyrennikov (2009) show how the
link between entry barriers and output volatility can arise in a general equilibrium model.
When there are no entry barriers, only the highest productivity ￿rms are operating, and,
thus, a positive technology shock does not alter the industry structure. However, when there
are entry barriers a positive shock induces more entry, increases competition, and forces
low productivity ￿rms to exit. As a result ￿rms￿average productivity increases, magnifying
the e⁄ect of a positive aggregate shock. Barseghyan and DiCecio (2009) construct a model
with endogenous entry and operation decisions by ￿rms and calibrate it to match the U.S.
distribution of ￿rms by age and size. Higher entry costs lead to greater misallocation of
productive factors and lower steady-state TFP and output. As in the data, higher entry
costs are associated with higher mean and variance of the employment distribution across
￿rms.
In our investigation, we use a measure of entry costs originally constructed by Djankov,
La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) and later expanded by The World Bank
(2007). Unlike most measures of institutional quality, this is a continuous variable capturing
the precise quantitative value of the object of interest. We control for property rights by
considering ￿ve proxies for property rights institutions: the rate of debt recovery from a
￿going-out-of-business￿borrower, three indices of property rights protection, and a social
infrastructure measure. Sources of exogenous variation in entry costs and the property rights
measures are given by the following instruments: geographical latitude and the fraction of
population speaking a major European language; the country￿ s legal origin; European settler
mortality in early stages of colonization, and indigenous population density in the early
sixteenth century.
The IV regressions reveal that entry costs have a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on output
volatility. The economic e⁄ect of entry costs is worth emphasizing. A one standard deviation
increase in entry costs is estimated to increase the standard deviation of the growth rate of
output per worker by 41% of its average value in our sample. Also, a one standard deviation
increase in entry costs increases the magnitude of the worst output drop by 60% of its sample
2average.
We perform a variety of checks to insure that the estimated strong e⁄ect of entry costs
on volatility is robust. Notably, we entertain the possibility raised by Glaeser, La Porta,
Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) that the de￿ning characteristic of a successful European
settlement was an increase in human capital. We include human capital as an endogenous
variable in the IV regressions. The robustness exercises con￿rm that entry costs are an
important determinant of output volatility. Moreover, the magnitude of this e⁄ect is close to
the one estimated in the benchmark regressions. The e⁄ect of property rights on volatility
remains insigni￿cant throughout robustness analysis.
This paper belongs to the empirical literature on institutions and growth, such as Hall
and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002); Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson,
and Tchaicharoedn (2003), Dollar and Kraay (2003), Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik,
Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) and earlier contributions by Knack and Keefer (1995) and
Mauro (1995). The empirical strategy employed in the paper is closest to that of Ace-
moglu and Johnson (2005) and Barseghyan (2008). As in these papers, our analysis hinges
upon availability of a set of instruments that a⁄ect current economic outcomes only through
institutions and are capable of separating out the e⁄ects of various institutional features.
Our ￿ndings suggest that entry costs, by a⁄ecting the composition of the pool of ￿rms,
impact volatility. Comparably, Koren and Tenreyro (2007) highlight the importance of the
sectorial composition in understanding the relationship between development and volatility.
Kraay and Ventura (2007) argue that comparative advantage determines di⁄erences in the
composition of ￿rms between rich and poor countries, making least developed countries more
volatile.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and method-
ology used to carry out the empirical investigation. We present the results of the empirical
investigation in Section 3 and discuss their robustness in Section 4. We conclude in Section
5. An Appendix provides data sources and de￿nitions.
32 Data and Methodology
2.1 Output Volatility
The benchmark measure of volatility is constructed using purchasing power adjusted GDP
per worker data from the Penn World Tables 6.2 constructed by Heston, Summers, and Aten
(2006). We consider only countries for which the data for output per worker is available
at least for twenty years and entry costs data are available.1 Our benchmark measure of
volatility is the standard deviation of the growth rate of output per worker. To assess the
robustness of our results, we will also consider the worst output drop, i.e., the minimum
growth rate of output per worker. For comparison purposes, we also construct the average
growth rate for each country and report descriptive statistics of it.
2.2 Entry Costs, Property Rights and Social Infrastructure
Entry costs come from the World Bank￿ s Doing Business data set and are available for 132
countries.2 They include all o¢ cial fees and dues that an entrepreneur must pay in the
process of completing legal procedures for starting a new ￿rm. They are constructed for a
￿standardized￿￿rm. Though this standardized ￿rm is of a relatively small size, it is quite
representative of a typical ￿rm, because smaller production units have a very large share of
aggregate employment.3
In most developed countries, entry costs are not a signi￿cant burden on entrepreneurs: For
example, in Canada entrepreneurs have to pay less than 1% of GNI per capita in entry costs
1Notice that for di⁄erent countries volatility, average growth, and worst out drop are computed for
di⁄erent time periods. Our results are robust to the use of the same sample for all countries, e.g., 1961-2003.
2We consider only countries for which both volatility and entry costs data are available.
3In a sample of OECD countries, for which harmonized ￿rm level data are available, the employment share
of the ￿rms with less than 50 workers is very substantial, about one-third of the total. In less developed
and developing countries, which constitute a large part of our sample, the employment share of smaller
establishments is much larger than in the developed countries, typically more than 60% of the total (see
Tybout, 2000).
4whereas the cross-country average is 79% of GNI per capita. Higher entry costs are associated
with worse macroeconomic conditions along several dimensions (see Table 1 and Figures 1-3).
Entry costs are positively correlated with volatility and negatively correlated with average
growth. Also, higher entry costs are associated with more severe crises, measured by the
worst output drop.
A proxy for property rights protection is more challenging. The ￿rst variable that we use
is the rate of debt recovery from a ￿going-out-of-business￿borrower. This is, to our knowl-
edge, the only available quantitative measure that can proxy property rights protection. The
second variable, ￿constraint on executive power,￿refers to ￿the extent of institutionalized
constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or col-
lectivities￿(Jaggers and Marshall, 2000). It can be used as a proxy for the protection of
private citizens and businesses against expropriation by executive power. However, it may
be ignoring the risk of expropriation by other agents. The third variable is the property
rights protection index constructed by the The Heritage Foundation (2006). The fourth
variable is the ￿expropriation risk￿ constructed by the Political Risk Services (1999). It
measures the risk of expropriation of private foreign investment by the government.4 Fi-
nally, we consider the social infrastructure measure proposed by Hall and Jones (1999): It
was constructed as the average between the government anti-diversion policy index and the
openness to international trade measure of Sachs and Warner (1995).
All property rights measures and social infrastructure are strongly positively correlated
with each other and are negatively correlated with output growth volatility. They are nega-
tively correlated with entry costs (see Table 1).
4Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) use constraint on executive, the Heritage Foundation index and expro-
priation risk to proxy for property rights. Their preferred measure is constraint on executive, because it
conceptually refers to constraints directly imposed on government actions. The other variables are equilib-
rium outcomes driven by policies that may result from such constraints.
52.3 The Econometric Model
The target is to identify and estimate the following relation:
Yi = ￿0 + ￿EEi + ￿OOi + Z
0
i￿Z + "i;
where Yi is the volatility of output growth for country i; Ei is the measure of entry costs,
Oi is the proxy for other institutions, Zi is the vector of additional controls, and "i is the
error term. Because of potential endogeneity, omitted variable bias and measurement error,
an instrumental variable procedure is implemented. Recall that for the validity of an IV
regression the following two assumptions must be satis￿ed:
(A1) The instruments should satisfy the rank condition: rank E([1 I Z]0[1 E O
Z]) = 3 + z; where I denotes the vector of instruments, and z is the number of additional
controls; and
(A2) The instruments should be uncorrelated with the error term "i.
2.4 Instruments
From the set of instruments available in the literature, we use geographic latitude, the fraction
of population speaking a major European language, legal origin, and, for a sub-sample of
ex-colonies, European settler mortality and indigenous population density.
The ￿rst two instruments come from Hall and Jones (1999), who argued that geographical
characteristics and the extent to which major European languages have been adopted in
a country are correlated with the quality of the country￿ s institutions. This is because
Europeans were more likely to settle and establish Western institutions in places where the
geographic characteristics were more similar to those in their origin countries, and because
the extent to which European culture and, consequently, European institutions have spread
in a country is likely to be correlated with the adoption of European languages.
Legal origin (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1999) has a strong e⁄ect
on various institutional features related to property rights, most notably on the degree of
6legal formalism which is associated with judicial transparency and fairness, corruption and
enforceability of contracts.
Settler mortality and population density, introduced by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son (2002); Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Tchaicharoedn (2003) can be used as instru-
ments because of their lasting e⁄ects on countries￿institutional development. Early European
settlements were negatively a⁄ected by high mortality rates. In places where Europeans were
settling in large numbers, it was in their interest to promote free entrepreneurship, provide
property rights protection, etc. Higher indigenous population density, on the other hand,
provided Europeans with an opportunity to capture and exploit local labor, giving rise to
extractive institutions and, therefore, poor property rights protection. Higher population
density should not necessarily lead to higher entry barriers. In fact, as shown in the next
section of the paper, the data reveals the opposite: population density has a negative e⁄ect
on entry costs.
We do not use the fraction of population speaking English or the predicted measure of
trade shares (Frankel and Romer, 1999), which have been used by Hall and Jones (1999).
They have no predictive power for entry costs or property rights measures, once the ￿ve
instruments described above are controlled for. Therefore, they are not relevant for our
analysis.
Because of data availability, the regressions below rely on samples of di⁄erent sizes. The
largest sample consists of 123 countries.
2.5 Moments of the Distribution of Firms by Size
In Table 1, we also report statistics for the mean and the variance of the distribution of ￿rms
by size, based on Alfaro, Charlton, and Kanczuk (2009). Higher volatility is associated to
a lower density of ￿rms (i.e., a larger average ￿rm size) and to more heterogeneity in ￿rms￿
sizes (i.e., a higher variance of the distribution of ￿rms by size). The ￿rst two moments of
the distribution of ￿rms by size are negatively related to measures of institutional quality
and positively correlated to entry costs (see Figures 4 and 5).
73 Results
3.1 Preliminaries: Endogenous Regressors and Instruments
As a starting point we aim to identify the minimum number of instruments that would allow
us to separately identify the e⁄ect of entry costs and the e⁄ect of property rights on output
volatility.
Table 2 presents the results of the OLS regressions of the endogenous regressors on all
available instruments. In Column 1, entry costs is the dependent variable. In Columns 2 to
5, the dependent variables are the proxies for the property rights protection. In Column 6,
social infrastructure is the dependent variable.
The table reveals di⁄erences between correlation patterns of institutional variables with
instruments; these di⁄erences guide our initial choice of instruments. First, the European
languages variable has an e⁄ect on entry costs, but no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on the
debt recovery rate, the Heritage Foundation index, expropriation risk or social infrastructure.
On the other hand, legal origin has no e⁄ect on entry costs, but has an e⁄ect on the debt
recovery rate, the Heritage Foundation index, expropriation risk and social infrastructure.
This suggests that IV regressions which use only legal origin and the European languages
variable as instruments might achieve identi￿cation. A natural advantage of these regressions
is that they do not involve population density or settler mortality and therefore can be
implemented on the full sample rather than the sub-sample of ex-colonies.
Second, while the population density has the expected negative e⁄ect on property rights
measures and social infrastructure, its e⁄ect on entry costs is of a wrong sign.5 Settler
mortality has the expected negative e⁄ect on all endogenous regressors. Neither of these two
variables has a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on constraint on executive. Because the latter
is correlated with the European languages variable and latitude, we consider IV regressions
which use population density, settler mortality and the European languages variable (or
latitude) as instruments.
5That is, higher population density implies lower entry barriers.
8In each of the following IV regressions we formally test whether the rank condition (A1)
is satis￿ed. In addition, when the number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous
regressors, we perform a test for over-identifying restrictions.
3.2 Main Results
Our preliminary regressions are carried out with two instruments: legal origin and the Eu-
ropean languages variable. The results of these regressions are reported in Columns 1-3 of
Table 3A. In the regressions reported in Column 1 property rights are proxied by the debt
recovery rate, in Column 2 - by the Heritage Foundation Index, and in Column 3 - by social
infrastructure.
We report three numbers for each instrumented variable: the coe¢ cient, the heteroskedas-
ticity robust standard error and the corresponding p-value. To save space, the intercept is
not reported. We also report the p-value of Cragg and Donald￿ s insu¢ cient rank test (see
Cragg and Donald, 1993). The null of this test is that the rank is insu¢ cient. The rejection
of the test provides con￿dence that the rank condition (A1) is satis￿ed. The number of
observations is reported last.
As Columns 1-3 show, entry costs have a statistically signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on volatil-
ity. However, the null of Cragg and Donald￿ s test is not rejected in all but one regression,6
implying that the instruments are not well suited to separately identify the e⁄ect of entry
costs and property rights. For robustness, we also report the results of these regressions
when latitude is used as an instrument instead of European languages (Columns 4-6). While
the results are similar to those reported in Columns 1-3, the p-values of the entry costs
coe¢ cient and of Cragg and Donald￿ s test are larger. This is expected given that neither
legal origin nor latitude are strongly correlated with entry costs.
Our benchmark regressions utilize three instruments: settler mortality, population den-
sity and the European languages variable. In Table 3B, Columns 1-5, we report the results for
6The regressions with constraint on executive and expropriation risk are not reported, because their
p-values of Cragg and Donald￿ s test are very high.
9all ￿ve proxies of property rights protection. The e⁄ect of entry costs in all these regressions
is negative and statistically signi￿cant. Its magnitude is close to that reported in Table 3A.
Property rights or social infrastructure have no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect in any of these
regressions. The null of Cragg and Donald￿ s test is rejected once at the 1% level, twice at the
5% level and twice at the 10% level. The null of the Hansen-Sargan over-identi￿cation test,7
which is that the exclusion restriction (A2) holds, is not rejected in any of these regressions.
This lends credibility to the validity of the instruments. In Columns 6-10 of Table 3B, we
repeat these regressions, but use latitude rather than European languages as an instrument.
The results of these regressions are similar to those reported in Columns 1-5, but as indicated
by the p-values of Cragg and Donald￿ s test, this set of instruments is weaker.
3.3 Economic Signi￿cance of Entry Barriers
The results described above suggest that entry barriers have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on output
volatility. The average value of the entry costs coe¢ cient in the ten regressions reported in
Table 3B is 1.85. This implies that an increase in entry costs by one standard deviation in
our sample, results in a 2.5 percentage point increase in the standard deviation of the growth
rate of output, which is roughly 41% of its mean value in our sample.
3.4 Entry Costs and Industry Structure
A structural interpretation of our results relies on the seminal work of Hopenhayn (1992).
Costlier entry leads to less competition and a lower number of operating ￿rms. With the
protection from potential entrants a⁄orded by high entry costs, low productivity ￿rms can
survive and operate. This implies that operating ￿rms are more heterogenous, i.e., a higher
dispersion of ￿rms￿productivity.8 This mechanism magni￿es the volatility stemming from
aggregate uncertainty. In the data, the lower density of operating ￿rms and the higher
heterogeneity in ￿rms￿ s size are associated to higher macroeconomic volatility (Figures 4
7See Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982); see Hayashi (2000) for a textbook treatment.
8See Barseghyan and DiCecio (2009) for a derivation of this result in a general equilibrium setting.
10and 5). Unfortunately, the paucity of data prevents us from analyzing directly the empirical
relationship between entry costs and industry structure in this paper. We leave this task for
future research.
4 Robustness
4.1 Increased Human Capital and European In￿ uence
Since settler mortality, population density, and latitude determined early European settle-
ment decisions, one might argue that human capital could be the omitted variable driving
the results because ￿what [Europeans] brought with them is themselves, and therefore their
know-how and human capital￿(Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004).9
These authors also show that the levels of educational attainment are persistent, implying
that the instruments should be correlated not only with past but also with current levels of
human capital. One strategy to deal with this problem is to include human capital in the IV
regressions. In the regressions reported in Column 1 of Table 4 the endogenous regressors are
entry costs and current human capital and they are instrumented by settler mortality and
population density. The entry costs coe¢ cient is signi￿cant and close in magnitude to those
in the benchmark regressions. Human capital is not signi￿cant. The null of the insu¢ cient
rank test is rejected at the 5% level.
Columns 2 and 3 show the regressions in which the debt recovery rate and constraint
on executive are added as the third regressor, respectively. In Column 2 the additional
instrument is legal origin and in Column 3 it is the European languages variable.10 In these
regressions entry costs remain statistically and economically signi￿cant. Property rights
9A similar argument might apply to the European languages variable, because it could be capturing the
spread of European human capital.
10This choice of instruments stems naturally from the correlation patterns reported in Table 2 because the
debt recovery rate is correlated with legal origin and is not correlated with the European languages variable.
Conversely, constraint on executive is not correlated with legal origin and is correlated with European
languages.
11measures have no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on output volatility. The null of Cragg and
Donald￿ s test is rejected once at the 5% level and once at the 10% level.
4.2 Corruption
We consider the possibility that corruption is an omitted endogenous regressor. This con-
sideration is motivated by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) who
present evidence that higher entry barriers are associated with higher levels of corruption.
From an econometric point of view, because corruption is correlated with entry costs, its
omission from the regressions may result in biased estimates of the e⁄ect of entry costs on
economic outcomes. However, it is likely that corruption itself is a cause of poor property
rights institutions, in particular, less constraint on executive and political power. There-
fore, inclusion of property rights measures as regressors in the benchmark regressions may
mitigate the potential bias in the entry costs coe¢ cients. Moreover, corruption is explicitly
taken into account in the construction of the Heritage Foundation￿ s property rights pro-
tection index and the social infrastructure measure of Hall and Jones (1999). We further
explore this issue by including corruption (as constructed by (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1999) in the IV regressions as an additional regressor (see Table 5).
In the ￿rst regression the endogenous regressors are entry costs and corruption, and they
are instrumented by settler mortality and population density. The entry costs coe¢ cient is
signi￿cant and close in magnitude to that in the benchmark regressions. The null of the
insu¢ cient rank test is rejected at the 1% level.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 present regressions in which the debt recovery rate and
constraint on executive are added as the third regressor, respectively. Additional instruments
are legal origin and the European languages variable, respectively. The entry costs coe¢ cient
in both regressions is economically signi￿cant. It is statistically signi￿cant in the regression
with constraint on executive but not with the debt recovery rate. Property rights measures
remain statistically insigni￿cant. The null of Cragg and Donald￿ s test is rejected in the
regression with the debt recovery rate at the 10% level and in the regression with constraint
12on executive - at the 5% level.
4.3 Entry Regulation versus Business Regulation
It could be the case that the signi￿cance of entry costs in the IV regressions re￿ ects the
importance of business regulation in general, rather than entry barriers per se. An attempt
to disentangle entry costs from the rest of business regulation would require a proper measure
of the latter. An index which comes close to such a measure is the one constructed by the
Heritage Foundation and previously used by La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1999). This index measures the di¢ culty for ￿entrepreneurs to create and/or maintain new
businesses.￿ 11
We include business regulation as an endogenous regressor and carry out the same set
of regressions as in the case of human capital and corruption (see Table 6). The results are
very close to those in the case in which corruption is included as an endogenous regressor.
This could be due to the fact that corruption within the bureaucracy is one of the variables
that the Heritage Foundation takes into account when constructing its measure of business
regulation. In our sample, the correlation between the latter and the corruption variable is
0.49.
4.4 Over-Identi￿cation
In all of the robustness exercises described above it is possible to test for over-identi￿cation
by including latitude as an additional instrument. Doing so does not change signi￿cantly
the magnitude or statistical signi￿cance of the entry costs coe¢ cients. The null of the over-
identi￿cation test is not rejected in any of these regressions.12
11There is a clear overlap between entry costs and this index, because the latter includes the di¢ culty in
starting a new business.
12To save space, the regression tables are not reported. They are available upon request.
134.5 Semi-Reduced Form Regressions
Because we are particularly interested in singling out the e⁄ect of entry costs, we employ
semi-reduced form regressions as an alternative to our benchmark regressions. In these re-
gressions all instruments are included as explanatory variables, except one which is necessary
to instrument entry costs. Such a speci￿cation aims to identify the e⁄ect of entry costs while
capturing directly the total e⁄ect of the included instruments on economic outcomes. As
such, it does not rely on the exact mechanisms through which included instruments a⁄ect
economic outcomes.
We start with semi-reduced form regressions in which the explanatory variables are entry
costs (instrumented by the settler mortality), and population density. The results of these
regressions are described in Column 1 of Table 7A. In Column 2 of this table we report
the same regressions, but with European languages as an additional included instrument; in
Column 3 - latitude; and in Column 4 - European languages and latitude. The regressions
con￿rm our earlier ￿ndings that entry costs are an important determinant of output volatility.
Indeed, the entry costs coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant and their values are close to
the ones reported in Tables 3B. Notably, none of the included instruments is statistically
signi￿cant. The null of Cragg and Donald￿ s test is rejected at the 1% level in all regressions.
We also perform regressions identical to those reported in Table 7A, except that the
European languages variable is now used as a regressor and settler mortality is used as the
instrument for entry costs (see Table 7B). The results are very close to those reported in
Table 7A. The p-values of Cragg and Donald￿ s test are slightly higher than in Table 7A
and so are the p-values of the entry costs coe¢ cient. None of the included instruments is
statistically signi￿cant.
Recall from Table 2 that the variation in entry costs is explained only by two instruments:
European languages and settler mortality.13 Tables 7A and 7B show that when controlling
for entry costs instrumented by one of these variables, the other variable has no independent
13The population density coe¢ cient in the entry costs regressions is statistically signi￿cant, but with a
wrong sign.
14e⁄ect on output volatility. Thus, exclusion of these instruments from the IV regressions
appears to be valid, as they a⁄ect the outcomes of interest only through entry costs (and,
possibly, property rights). Other included instruments have no e⁄ect on output volatility,
which strengthens our argument that entry costs are a primary institutional determinant of
output volatility.
4.6 Initial Conditions
Often, initial conditions are included in the growth regressions to control for convergence
e⁄ects. In our context, initial conditions might be relevant also because poorer countries
have higher output volatility (see Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997).
In Table 3C we perform the benchmark regressions with the initial level of output per
worker added as an included instrument. The results on entry costs and property rights
remain essentially unchanged. The initial level of output per worker is insigni￿cant in all
regressions.
4.7 Outliers, ￿New Europe￿ , and Africa Dummy
In Columns 1-3 of Table 3D we perform the benchmark regressions with entry costs and the
debt recovery rate as endogenous regressors and settler mortality, population density, and
the European languages variable as instruments. The Column 1 regressions di⁄er from those
in Column 1 of Table 3B only in one aspect, namely that the outliers (i.e., countries with
entry costs above 500% of GNI) are dropped. The Column 2 regressions do not include ￿New
Europe￿(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and USA). The Column 3 regressions control for
the African continent.
The entry cost coe¢ cient is statistically signi￿cant, except in the regression with Africa
dummy. However, in that regression, the p-value of Cragg and Donald test is 0.22.
Columns 4-6 report the same regressions as those in Column 1-3, except that instead of
the European languages variable, latitude is used as an instrument. Here, entry costs are
signi￿cant in all three regression, but the p-values of Cragg and Donald￿ s test are higher.
15Table 3E o⁄ers identical analysis, except we use constraint on executive rather than the
debt recovery rate as a proxy for property rights. The entry costs coe¢ cients are signi￿cant
and constraint on executive is insigni￿cant in all regressions. The null of the insu¢ cient rank
test is rejected at the 10% level in all regressions. The null hypothesis of over-identi￿cation
test is not rejected.
4.8 Summary of Statistical Robustness Checks
In sum, the e⁄ect of entry costs on output volatility is statistically and economically signif-
icant and this result is not driven by an omission of human capital, corruption or business
regulation from the regressions. Moreover, the instruments, in particular, those correlated
with entry costs, do not have an independent e⁄ect on output volatility. Once entry costs
are controlled for, property rights appear to have no e⁄ect on output volatility.
While in the exercises above we ￿nd no indication that an omitted endogenous regressor
biases the results, such possibility cannot be excluded with certainty. It could be that entry
costs and property rights (almost) fully capture the e⁄ect of other institutions that are
correlated with the instruments and a⁄ect output volatility. In such a case, the results here
should be interpreted as strong evidence for the existence of a set of institutions that are
very much distinct from those related to property rights and that a⁄ect output volatility.
Entry costs should be viewed as a good proxy for this set of institutions.
4.9 Other Volatility Measures
We also investigate whether entry costs a⁄ect the magnitude of economic downturns. In
Table 3F, we perform regressions identical to those in Table 3B, except the outcome of
interest is the worst drop in output. The latter is computed as the minimum growth rate of
output per worker.
The results of these regressions are in accord with our previous ￿ndings: entry costs have
a strong e⁄ect on the severity of economic crises in all regressions; property rights protection
does not a signi￿cant e⁄ect in any regression. The null of Cragg and Donald￿ s test is not
16rejected (at the 10% level) in seven out of ten regressions. The null of the over-identi￿cation
test is not rejected in any regression.
The magnitude of the e⁄ect of entry costs on the severity of the economic crisis is very
large. The average value of the entry costs coe¢ cient in the ten regressions reported in Table
3F is 5.93. This implies that an increase in entry costs by one standard deviation in our
sample, results in a 7.92 percentage points increase in size of the worst output drop, which
is about 60% of its mean value in our sample.
5 Conclusions
Understanding the reasons behind cross-country di⁄erences in economic outcomes remains a
primary goal of economics. Although recent advances in the literature have identi￿ed institu-
tions as major determinants of economic outcomes, little is known about the role and relative
importance of speci￿c institutions. We ￿nd that entry regulation is an important determi-
nant of output volatility, while property rights protection is not. These results strengthen the
view that entry costs are an important institutional feature and that the e⁄ect of institutions
on economy occurs via their impact on industry structure (see e.g., Nickell, 1996; Acemoglu,
Johnson, Robinson, and Tchaicharoedn, 2003; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Bastos and
Nasir, 2004; Sivadasan, 2003; Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti, and Schiantarelli, 2005; Bruhn,
2008; Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho, and Shleifer, 2008; Barseghyan, 2008).
For policymakers looking for well-de￿ned strategies to stabilize the economies of less
developed countries, our paper provides an additional argument for the elimination of entry
barriers: The estimated e⁄ect of such a policy is a sizable decrease in volatility.
17Appendix: Data Sources and De￿nitions
1. Entry costs: The World Bank (2004, 2005, 2006a,b, 2007).14 Entry costs are con-
structed for ￿a ￿ standardized￿￿rm which has the following characteristics: 1) it per-
forms general industrial or commercial activities, it operates in the largest city (by
population), 2) it is exempt from industry-speci￿c requirements (including environ-
mental ones), it does not participate in foreign trade and does not trade in goods that
are subject to excise taxes (e.g., liquor, tobacco, gas), it is a domestically-owned lim-
ited liability company, 3) its capital is subscribed in cash (not in-kind contributions)
and is the higher of (i) 10 times GDP per capita in 1999 or (ii) the minimum capital
requirement for the particular type of business entity, it rents (i.e., does not own) land
and business premises, it has between 5 and 50 employees one month after the com-
mencement of operations, all of whom are nationals, it has turnover of up to 10 times
its start-up capital, and it does not qualify for investment incentives.￿
2. Debt recovery rate: The World Bank (2004, 2005, 2006a,b, 2007). The recovery rate is
recorded as cents on the dollar recovered by claimants￿ creditors, tax authorities and
employees￿ through the bankruptcy proceedings. The calculation takes into account
whether the business is kept as a going concern during the proceedings, as well as
bankruptcy costs and the loss in value due to the time spent closing down.
3. PPP adjusted GDP per worker: Penn World Tables 6.2.15
4. Constraint on executive power: Polity IV Project Jaggers and Marshall (2000).16 This
variable ￿refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making
powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities,￿and takes values from
1 to 7, where 1 is unlimited authority; 3 - slight to moderate limitations; 5 - substantial




18or subordination. For more details see the Polity IV Project manual.
5. Property rights protection index: the Heritage Foundation￿ s 2006 Index of Economic
Freedom data set.17 From 1 to 5 (in the regressions, the scale is reversed, e.g., 5 = 1
and 1 = 5):
1- Private property guaranteed by government; court system e¢ ciently enforces
contracts; justice system punishes those who unlawfully con￿scate private property;
corruption nearly nonexistent, and expropriation highly unlikely.
2- Private property guaranteed by government; court system su⁄ers delays and is
lax in enforcing contracts; corruption possible but rare; expropriation unlikely.
3- Court system ine¢ cient and subject to delays; corruption may be present;
judiciary may be in￿ uenced by other branches of government; expropriation possible
but rare.
4- Property ownership weakly protected; court systemine¢ cient; corruption present;
judiciary in￿ uenced by other branches of government; expropriation possible.
5- Private property outlawed or not protected; almost all property belongs to
the state; country in such chaos (for example, because of ongoing war) that property
protection nonexistent; judiciary so corrupt that property not e⁄ectively protected;
expropriation frequent.
The index is constructed based on the following factors: (i) freedom from government
in￿ uence over the judicial system; (ii) commercial code de￿ning contracts; (iii) sanc-
tioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes; (iv) government expropriation of
property; (v) corruption within the judiciary; (vi) delays in receiving judicial decisions
and/or enforcement; and (vii) legally granted and protected private property.
6. Protection against expropriation risk: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). Risk
of expropriation of private foreign investment, from 0 to 10. Higher score means less
17Available at http://www.heritage.org/Index/.
19risk. Original source: Political Risk Services (September 1999).
7. Social infrastructure: Hall and Jones (1999). They constructed it as an average of the
openness to trade index and the GADP index. Openness to trade index was taken from
Sachs and Warner (1995). GADP index is an equal weighted average of ￿ve indices:
(i) law and order, (ii) bureaucratic quality, (iii) corruption, (iv) risk of expropriation,
and (v) government repudiation of contracts. All of these were taken from Political
Risk Services.
8. European settlers￿mortality: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). Estimated
mortality for European settlers during early period of European colonization (before
1850).
9. Population density in 1500: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002). Indigenous
population density in 1500, inhabitants per square kilometer.
10. Fraction of population speaking a major European language: Hall and Jones (1999)
based on Gunnemark (1991) and Hunter (1992).
11. Latitude: La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999). The absolute value
of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and 1. Original Source:
CIA Factbook.
12. Government corruption variable: La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1999). ￿Low ratings indicates ￿ high government o¢ cials are likely to demand special
payments￿and ￿ illegal payments are generally expected through lower levels of gov-
ernment￿in the form of bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange
controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans.￿Scale 0 to 10. Average value over
1972-1995. Original Source: International Country Risk Guide.
13. Business regulation: La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999). From 1 to
5. The index is constructed based on the following factors: (1) licensing requirements
20to operate a business; (ii) ease of obtaining a business license; (iii) corruption within
the bureaucracy; (iv) labor regulations, such as established work-weeks, paid vacations,
and parental leave, as well as selected labor regulations; (v) environmental, consumer
safety, and worker health regulations; and (vi) regulations that impose a burden on
business. Original Source: the Heritage Foundation￿ s Index of Economic Freedom data
set.
14. Moments of the distribution of employment by size class across countries: Alfaro,
Charlton, and Kanczuk (2009). This data is constructed from micro-data collected in
Dun & Bradstreet￿ s WorldBase. The unit of observation is the plant.
For our cross-sectional study, only one observation is needed for each of the variables
above. For entry costs and the debt recovery rate we take the average over the ￿ve years
(2004-2008) for which data are available. For the constraint on executive variable and the
property rights index, we average over the last ten years in which they were reported: 1994-
2003 and 1996-2005, respectively. For the expropriation risk variable we use the average over
1985-1995.
Ideally, one would take the averages over the same period of time for all variables. Un-
fortunately, this is not possible due to data limitations. For some countries data for one or
more years might be missing. We ignore these years when constructing averages.18
18When constructing the averages for constraint on executive, interregnum and transitional periods are
ignored, except for Congo (Kinshasa). Because for this country all years between 1994 and 2003 were
classi￿ed as interregnum or transitional, we use the value for year 1991, the last year for which constraint
on executive was recorded.
21References
Acemoglu, D., and S. Johnson (2005): ￿Unbundling Institutions,￿Journal of Political
Economy, 113(5), 949￿ 995.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2001): ￿The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,￿ American Economic Review,
91(5), 1369￿ 1401.
(2002): ￿Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the
Modern World Income Distribution,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1231￿ 94.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J. A. Robinson, and Y. Tchaicharoedn (2003): ￿In-
stitutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth,￿Journal of
Monetary Economics, 50, 49￿ 123.
Acemoglu, D., and F. Zilibotti (1997): ￿Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk,
Diversi￿cation, and Growth,￿Journal of Political Economy, 105(4), 709￿ 51.
Alesina, A., S. Ardagna, G. Nicoletti, and F. Schiantarelli (2005): ￿Regulation
and Investment,￿Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(4), 791￿ 825.
Alfaro, L., A. Charlton, and F. Kanczuk (2009): ￿Plant-Size Distribution and Cross-
Country Income Di⁄erences,￿in NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2008,
ed. by J. Frankel, and C. Pissarides, vol. 5. University of Chicago Press.
Barseghyan, L. (2008): ￿Entry Costs and Cross-Country Di⁄erences in Productivity and
Output,￿Journal of Economic Growth, 13, 145￿ 167.
Barseghyan, L., and R. DiCecio (2009): ￿Entry Costs, Misallocation, and Cross-
Country Income and TFP Di⁄erences,￿Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper
No. 2009-005A.
22Barseghyan, L., R. DiCecio, and V. Tsyrennikov (2009): ￿Entry Barriers, Industry
Structure, and Macroeconomic Volatility,￿unpublished manuscript, Cornell University.
Bastos, F., and J. Nasir (2004): ￿Productivity and Investment Climate: What Matters
Most?,￿World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3335.
Bruhn, M. (2008): ￿License to Sell: The E⁄ect of Business Registration Reform on Entre-
preneurial Activity in Mexico,￿World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4538.
Cragg, J., and S. Donald (1993): ￿Testing Identi￿ability and Speci￿cation in Instru-
mental Variable Models,￿Econometric Theory, 9, 222￿ 240.
Djankov, S., T. Ganser, C. McLiesh, R. Ramalho, and A. Shleifer (2008): ￿The
E⁄ect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship,￿NBER Working Paper
No. 13576.
Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez de Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2002): ￿The
Regulation of Entry,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1￿ 37.
Dollar, D., and A. Kraay (2003): ￿Institutions, Trade and Growth,￿Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 50(1), 133￿ 62.
Easterly, W., and R. Levine (2003): ￿Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments
In￿ uence Economic Development,￿Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(1), 3￿ 39.
Frankel, J. A., and D. Romer (1999): ￿Does Trade Cause Growth?,￿American Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 89(3), 379￿ 399.
Glaeser, E. L., R. La Porta, F. Lopez de Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2004): ￿Do
Institutions Cause Growth?,￿Journal of Economic Growth, 9(3), 271￿ 303.
Gunnemark, E. V. (1991): Countries, Peoples, and their Languages: The Geolinguistic
Handbook. Summer Institute of Linguistics, Inc., Dallas, Texas.
23Hall, R. E., and C. I. Jones (1999): ￿Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More
Output Per Worker Than Others?,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(1), 83￿ 116.
Hansen, L. P. (1982): ￿Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Esti-
mators,￿Econometrica, 50(4), 1029￿ 54.
Hayashi, F. (2000): Econometrics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Heston, A., R. Summers, and B. Aten (2006): ￿Penn World Tables Version 6.2,￿
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University
of Pennsylvania.
Hopenhayn, H. A. (1992): ￿Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium,￿
Econometrica, 60(5), 1127￿ 1150.
Hunter, B. F. (ed.) (1992): Ethnologue: Languages of the World.Gothenburg, Sweden.
Lanstryckeriet.
Jaggers, K., and M. G. Marshall (2000): Polity IV Project.Center for International
Development and Con￿ ict Management, University of Maryland.
Knack, S., and P. Keefer (1995): ￿Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-
Country Tests Using Alternative Measures,￿Economics and Politics, 7(3), 207￿ 27.
Koren, M., and S. Tenreyro (2007): ￿Volatility and Development,￿Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 122(1), 243￿ 87.
Kraay, A., and J. Ventura (2007): ￿Comparative Advantage and the Cross-Section of
Business Cycles,￿Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(6), 1300￿ 33.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1999): ￿The
Quality of Government,￿Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15, 222￿ 279.
Mauro, P. (1995): ￿Corruption and Growth,￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3),
681￿ 712.
24Nickell, S. J. (1996): ￿Competition and Corporate Performance,￿ Journal of Political
Economy, 104(4), 724￿ 46.
Nicoletti, G., and S. Scarpetta (2003): ￿Regulation, Productivity and Growth: OECD
Evidence,￿Economic Policy, 18(36), 9￿ 72.
Political Risk Services (1999): Political Risk Yearbook. PRS Group, East Syracuse,
NY.
Rodrik, D., A. Subramanian, and F. Trebbi (2004): ￿Institutions Rule: The Primacy
of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,￿Journal of
Economic Growth, 9(2), 131￿ 165.
Sachs, J. D., and A. Warner (1995): ￿Economic Reform and the Process of Global
Integration,￿Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1￿ 95.
Sargan, J. D. (1958): ￿The Estimation of Economic Relationships Using Instrumental
Variables,￿Econometrica, 26(3), 393￿ 415.
Sivadasan, J. (2003): ￿Barriers to Entry and Productivity: Micro-Evidence from Indian
Manufacturing Sector Reforms,￿unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago, Graduate
School of Business.
The Heritage Foundation (2006): 2006 Index of Economic Freedom. The Heritage Foun-
dation and The Wall Street Journal, Washington, D.C. and New York, NY.
The World Bank (2004): Doing Business in 2004 - Understanding Regulation. The In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
(2005): Doing Business in 2005 - Removing Obstacles to Growth. The International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
25(2006a): Doing Business in 2006 - Creating Jobs. The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
(2006b): Doing Business in 2007 - How to Reform. The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
(2007): Doing Business in 2008. The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development / The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Tybout, J. R. (2000): ￿Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do They
Do, and Why?,￿Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1), 11￿ 44.














































Figure 1: Volatility and entry costs: data and linear ￿t line (slope 1.74, p-value 0.000).
Two outliers (entry costs > 500% of GNI) exluded.














































Figure 2: Growth and entry costs: data and linear ￿t line (slope -1.01, p-value 0.000).
Two outliers (entry costs > 500% of GNI) exluded.






























Figure 3: Crises and entry costs: data and linear ￿t line (slope -4.85, p-value 0.000).
Two outliers (entry costs > 500% of GNI) exluded.


































Figure 4: Average ￿rms￿size and entry costs: data and linear ￿t line (slope 0.74, p-value
0.001).
One outlier (entry costs > 500% of GNI) exluded.






































Figure 5: Variance of ￿rms￿size and entry costs: data and linear ￿t line (slope 0.55, p-value
0.001).
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38Table 4. IV Regressions of Avg. and Std. Dev. of Growth Rate of Output per Worker with Human
Capital as an Endogenous Regressor.
1 2 3
Entry Costs 1.94 1.89 1.82
(Robust S. E.) (0.81) 1.09 (0.90)
p-value 0.02 0.08 0.04
Human 0.12 0.19 -0.31








Insufficient Rank 0.05 0.06 0.04
Observations 49 49 49
Notes: In Column 1 regressions the instruments are Settler Mortality and Population Density.
In Column 2 regressions the instruments are Settler Mortality, Population Density, and Legal Origin.
In Column 3 regressions the instruments are Settler Mortality, Population Density, and European Languages.
Dependent Variable: Std. Dev. of Growth Rate
39Table 5. IV Regressions of Avg. and Std. Dev. of Growth Rate of Output per Worker with Corruption
as an Endogenous Regressor.
1 2 3
Entry Costs 1.94 1.82 1.99
(Robust S. E.) (0.77) (1.74) (0.84)
p-value 0.01 0.30 0.02









Insufficient Rank 0.01 0.08 0.02
Observations 59 59 58
Notes: In Column 1 regressions the instruments are Settler Mortality and Population Density.
In Column 2 regressions the instruments are Settler Mortality, Population Density, and Legal Origin.
In Column 3 regressions the instruments are Settler Mortality, Population Density, and European Languages.
Dependent Variable: Std. Dev. of Growth Rate
40Table 6. IV Regressions of Avg. and Std. Dev. of Growth Rate of Output per Worker with Business
Regulation as an Endogenous Regressor.
1 2 3
Entry Costs 2.00 1.82 2.00
(Robust S. E.) (0.83) (1.95) (0.88)
p-value 0.02 0.35 0.02
Business 0.30 0.56 -0.64








Insufficient Rank 0.03 0.12 0.02
Observations 57 57 56
Notes: In Column 1 regressions the instruments are Settler Mortality and Population Density.
In Column 2 regressions the instruments are Settler Mortality, Population Density, and Legal Origin.
In Column 3 regressions the instruments are Settler Mortality, Population Density, and European Languages.
Dependent Variable: Std. Dev. of Growth Rate
41T
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